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    <title>Intel on binreaper</title>
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      <title>A GHSA without a CVE: disclosing four bugs in bmcweb</title>
      <link>https://binreaper.pages.dev/posts/2026-05-27-bmcweb-disclosure/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;tldr&#34;&gt;TL;DR&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In February 2026 I audited bmcweb — the OpenBMC web server that runs on most modern BMCs from Intel, IBM, HPE, and NVIDIA. The audit produced four reportable findings: three pre-auth denial-of-service primitives on the HTTP path, and one mTLS authentication bypass. All four were disclosed privately to &lt;code&gt;openbmc-security@lists.ozlabs.org&lt;/code&gt; on 2026-02-23. Joseph Reynolds (IBM, openbmc-security responder) responded the same day, indicating that &amp;ldquo;90 days is consistent with project timelines&amp;rdquo; but proposing to defer setting a fixed disclosure date until &amp;ldquo;BMCWeb developers come up with a fix and let affected members ask if they need more time.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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